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Refusing Work To Avoid Serious Injury
or Death:
An Empirical Study of Legal Protections
Before and During COVID-19
Michael H. LeRoy*
Abstract
I present data on court and administrative rulings involving employees
who were disciplined or quit after refusing to work due to concerns about
death or injury. My sample of 109 pre-pandemic cases from 1944–2020, and
its comparison to twelve COVID-19 cases in 2020 and 2021, shows an emerging picture of new forms of work refusal. The cases before COVID-19 were
concentrated in mining, construction, and transportation. In contrast, the
COVID-19 cases span new occupations in social services, education, law,
healthcare, protective services, food preparation, and building cleaning. Before COVID-19, employees lost most work refusal cases because laws such as
the National Labor Relations Act, Occupational Safety Health Act, and others
narrowly protect them from employer retaliation. In the past year, the Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act afforded workers broader protections; however, it
expired at the end of 2020.
I conclude that work refusal laws are out of date in today’s workplace
because they apply mostly to work refusal in mines, construction, and trucking—male-dominated workplaces, with 10% to 30% female workers. These
industrial settings do not reflect changes in the economy that have expanded
jobs in service and office sectors or the growth of gig work that falls outside
the protections of work refusal statutes.
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“One of the great needs in industry today is the protection of life and limb
and health . . . . [W]e do not want to place in this law any provision which
would require men to work under abnormally dangerous conditions.”1
“We are talking about people’s lives, not the indifference of some cost
accountants. We are talking about assuring the men and women who work in
our plants and factories that they will go home after a day’s work with their
bodies intact.”2
“They never listen.”3
I. INTRODUCTION
Does an employee have a right to refuse abnormally dangerous work conditions?4 My research question is framed by a larger principle: Self* Michael H. LeRoy, LER Alumni Professor, School of Labor and Employment Relations and
College of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The idea for this research originated
from a live interview on KCBS radio (San Francisco) on March 30, 2020, during an extremely anxious
time when COVID-19 lockdowns were implemented across the country. Stan Bunger (KCBS Anchor), Nic Palmer (News Operations Manager), and Frni Beyer (Morning Editor) recognized the importance of work refusal during the pandemic and provided a catalyst for my research. My Research
Assistants—Elizabeth Ayala, Hailey Buffone, and Alondra Rios—provided invaluable assistance under the stress and difficult circumstances of COVID-19. The LER Alumni Professorship funded this
research. In addition, my project was supported by administrative assistance from Lynne Hoveln,
Wyatt Martin, and Amanda Boyd. Janet LeRoy offered guidance and encouragement for conducting
this research during an especially perilous time. To all of you, I owe my gratitude.
1. 92 CONG. REC. 5,687 (1946).
2. S. REP. NO. 91-1282, at 2 (1970), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE S. COMM. ON
LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ACT OF 1970 (1971) [hereinafter LEG. HIST. OSHA].
3. May-Ying Lam, Voices from the Aisles: The People Who Have Kept America’s Grocery Stores
Open, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/01/07/grocery-essential-workers-coronavirus/ (quoting Jacob Streich, a twenty-year-old cashier at Kroger, expressing
his futile efforts to have unmasked customers comply with the store’s masking policy).
4. See infra Part IV. Media outlets have attempted to answer this question, which was central for
many employees who were forced to work through the most uncertain times of the COVID-19 pandemic; however, the issue continues to remain relevant as the pandemic rages on. See generally Madeleine Carlisle, Scared To Return to Work Amid the COVID- 19 Pandemic? These Federal Laws Could
Grant You Some Protections, TIME (May 6, 2020), https://time.com/5832140/going-back-to-work-
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preservation has been recognized for millennia.5 Rome6 and England7 gave
legal effect to this idea. American courts transplanted this fundamental right.8
coronavirus-rights/ (citing several federal statutory protections that workers could consider in states
with weak employment protection laws); Lisa MacLellan & Michelle Cheng, Can You Quit and File
for Unemployment if Your Workplace is Unsafe about COVID-19?, QUARTZ (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://qz.com/1961649/can-you-get-unemployment-if-your-job-is-unsafe-about-covid-19/ (outlining
the unemployment benefit implications of workers who quit because of unsafe COVID-19 working
conditions).
5. A. J. Ashworth, Self-Defence and the Right to Life, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 282, 282 (1975) (“The
idea of physical security as one of the ‘natural rights’ of mankind has a long history . . . .”). Authoritative commentators have noted the foundational aspects of self-preservation: For the soul, see
ARISTOTLE, Book IX, in NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (W. D. Ross trans., 1999), https://historyofeconomicthought.mcmaster.ca/aristotle/Ethics.pdf (“Now each of these is true of the good man’s relation to
himself . . . . For . . . he desires the same things with all his soul; and therefore he wishes for himself
what is good and what seems so, and does it . . . for his own sake (for he does it for the sake of the
intellectual element in him, which is thought to be the man himself); and he wishes himself to live and
be preserved . . . .”). For living organisms, see CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 201
(Adam M. Goldstein ed., 1859 London 2011), http://darwin.amnh.org/files/images/pdfs/e83461.pdf
(“Natural selection will never produce in a being anything injurious to itself, for natural selection acts
solely by and for the good of each. No organ will be formed . . . for the purpose of causing pain or for
doing an injury to its possessor.”). For the establishment of government as a means to promote selfpreservation, see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 115 (Univ. of Mich. Rev. ed. 1904) (1651) (“The
final[] Cause, End, or Design[] of men . . . in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves[] (in
which we[] see them live in [commonwealths]) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a
more contented life thereby . . . .”). For preservation of the United States, see Abraham Lincoln, House
Divided Speech, 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 452 (Roy P. Basler ed., 2006) (“A
house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure permanently half
slave and half free.”). For natural selections that are enabling COVID-19 to mutate along a track to
permanence, see Bette Korber et al., Spike Mutation Pipeline Reveals the Emergence of a More Transmissible Form of SARS-CoV-2, BIORXIV 1, 12 (2020), https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.29.069054v2.full.pdf+html (“[R]ecombination provides an opportunity for the
virus to bring together, into a single recombinant virus, multiple mutations that independently confer
distinct fitness advantages but that were carried separately in the two parental strains.”).
6. See Will Tysse, The Roman Legal Treatment of Self Defense and the Private Possession of
Weapons in the Codex Justinianus, 16 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 163, 165 (2004) (“We grant to all
persons the unrestricted power to defend themselves . . . so that it is proper to subject anyone, whether
a private person or a soldier, who trespasses upon fields at night in search of plunder, or lays by busy
roads plotting to assault passers-by, to immediate punishment in accordance with the authority granted
to all.”).
7. See generally Joseph H. Beale Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567
(1903) (providing a comprehensive review of the English law on killing in self-defense). In short,
“the right to kill in self-defense was slowly established[] and is a doctrine of modern rather than of
medieval law.” Id.
8. See, e.g., Williams v. Register of West Tenn., 3 Tenn. 214, 218 (1812) (“A desire of selfpreservation is the first law of all being.”); Glasgow’s Lessee v. Smith, 1 Tenn. 144, 166 (Tenn. Super.
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In this study, I examine self-preservation in the context of COVID-19—
specifically, when employees refuse work due to a concern of contracting this
infection.9 The COVID-19 pandemic has put many workers in a vice: One
jaw is the necessity to work to subsist or to serve the public as a frontline
worker. The other jaw is risk of serious illness or death.10
Specifically, employers in hospitals,11 meatpacking plants,12 grocery

Ct. L. & Eq. 1805) (“[N]ations as well as individuals are tenacious of the rights of self-preservation . . . .”); Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438, 509 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1819) (“[T]he unqualified
inhibition of all intercourse and negotiations with an enemy, by the law of war, unless sanctioned by
government, is dictated by the great law of self-preservation, which is immutable in its nature . . . .”);
see also Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 83 (1877) (“This right of self-defence is commonly stated in the
American cases thus: If the person assaulted, being himself without fault, reasonably apprehends death
or great bodily harm to himself, unless he kills the assailant, the killing is justifiable.”).
9. See Jack Healy, Workers Fearful of the Coronavirus Are Getting Fired and Losing Their Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/us/virus-unemploymentfired.html.
10. See Lost on the Frontline, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2020/aug/11/lost-on-the-frontline-covid-19-coronavirus-us-healthcare-workers-deaths-database
(last visited Oct. 8, 2021). The evidence is reflected in the toll of COVID-19. Id. In the first year of
the pandemic, the virus claimed the lives of 3,607 healthcare workers in the United States. Id.; see
also Jim Salter & Leah Willingham, Teacher Deaths from COVID-19 Raise Alarms as New School
Year Begins, PBS (Sep. 9, 2020) (reporting that thirty-one teachers were among seventy-five people
employed by the New York City Department of Education who died due to COVID-19 in the early
phase of the disease); Lam, supra note 3 (reporting that as of November 2020, the United Food and
Commercial Workers said that at least 109 grocery workers in the union had died from COVID-19).
11. N.Y. State Nurses Ass’n v. Montefiore Hosp., 457 F. Supp. 3d 430, 430–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(summarizing the New York State Nurses Association’s injunction to order defendant hospital to provide respirators, other personal protective equipment, and rapid-response COVID-19 tests as necessary work precautions). Ironically, the fact that nurses had a union along with a collective bargaining
agreement meant that their labor dispute could only go to arbitration. Id. at 434.
12. Rural Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1232, 1234 (W.D.
Mo. 2020) (deciding whether injunctive relief was appropriate for workers against a meatpacking plant
that became a major COVID-19 hot spot due to failure to maintain safe practices such as social distancing, handwashing, masking, and use of sick leave policy); see also Fernandez v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 509 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 107–71 (N.D. Iowa 2020) (hearing decedent employee’s estate’s lawsuit
against meat processing company arising out of the employer’s alleged inadequate safety procedures
and omissions related to COVID-19 pandemic workplace safety).
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stores,13 public transit,14 rail freight,15 restaurants and bars,16 correctional facilities,17 fulfillment centers,18 and schools19 have put their workers in this
vice.
My study investigates rulings from courts and agencies involving employees who refused to work when they believed their work assignment posed
a risk of death or serious injury.20 My research poses these questions:
1. What occupations are most frequently involved in these cases?21 What
specific risks of fatality or serious harm arise in these cases?22 What consequences do workers face for disobeying a work order in these circumstances?23
2. What statutes apply in these situations?24 How do federal and state
13. Warner v. United Nat. Foods, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 3d 477, 480–81 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (involving a
food distribution worker who alleged “that he was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for his complaint to the Department of Health” or, alternatively, that he was wrongfully terminated for missing
work as he waited for the result of his COVID-19 test after he self-isolated at home with symptoms of
the virus).
14. See Winnie Hu & Nate Schweber, ‘I’m Miserable’: Why the Wait for the Subway Feels Longer
Than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/13/nyregion/nyc- subwaydelays-worker-shortage.html (noting that COVID-19 has killed at least 168 New York City workers).
15. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emp. Div. of Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 509 F.
Supp. 3d 1117, 1121–22 (D. Neb. 2020) (referencing a petition filed by several rail unions to seek an
emergency work safety order from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)). The FRA did not
issue an order but simply issued a “Safety Advisory” that encouraged railroads to abide by Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention guidelines. Id.
16. Massey v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 20 CH 4247, 2020 WL 5700874, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 24,
2020) (seeking an injunction in response to inadequate steps by McDonald’s to contain the virus, such
as providing adequate protective equipment, hand sanitizer, and safety training for employees, or enforcing safety protocols).
17. Arnold v. Corecivic of Tenn., LLC, No. 20-CV-0809 W (MDD), 2021 WL 63109, at *1–2
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2021) (hearing plaintiff correctional officer’s allegation that he was forced to quit
due to his employer’s failure to take measures to provide a workplace that adequately dealt with health
risks from COVID-19).
18. Palmer v. Amazon.com, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 3d 359, 364–65 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (deciding whether
Amazon failed to adhere to state labor regulations and create safe working conditions for its warehouse
employees by not providing adequate safeguards against the transmission of COVID-19).
19. Salter & Willingham, supra note 10, at 105.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Table 1.
22. See infra Table 1.
23. See infra Table 1.
24. See infra Sections II.A.1, II.B.1 (discussing the pertinent statutes in work refusal litigation).
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statutes apply to specific industries and work settings?25 How do these laws
differ in recognizing a worker’s right to refuse a work order on grounds of
personal safety?26
3. What common law causes of action apply in these situations—for example, the tort of wrongful discharge?27
4. How often do workers prevail in these cases?28 How do rulings in
favor of workers vary by statutes and by common law actions?29 Are workers
more successful under federal or state laws?30
My inquiry begins in Part II with an overview of federal and state statutes
and common law doctrines that employees have used to offer legal justifications to refuse work directives.31
In Section III.A, I explain my research methodology.32 Section III.B presents my data in a series of tables and distils fact findings from the empirical
results.33
Part IV provides interpretations of my findings.34 I examine cases—their
facts and court or agency rulings—that provide specific contexts to understand the data.35
Part V presents my conclusions.36 Federal and state work refusal laws are
out of date in today’s workplace.37 They provide some legal protection against
employer retaliation for work refusal in mines, on construction sites, and in
trucking.38 However, prior to COVID-19 these laws provided meager benefits
to employees who refused to work when risks involved chemicals, radiation,

25. See infra Table 4.A.
26. See infra Sections II.A.1, II.B.1 (noting the varying levels of protection provided by federal
and state work refusal laws).
27. See infra Sections II.A.2, II.B.2.
28. See infra Table 2.A.
29. See infra Table 1.
30. See infra Table 1.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Section III.A.
33. See infra Section III.B.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See infra Part IV.
36. See infra Part V.
37. See infra Part V.
38. See infra notes 203–19 and accompanying text.
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cedar dust, and other microscopic or invisible hazards.39
Special legislation for work refusal during COVID-19 is leading to somewhat better outcomes for frontline workers who are facing unmitigated exposure to the virus, but the initial win rate is essentially fifty-fifty between employees and their employers.40 In any event, this legislation has expired,
except for an obscure tax credit to employers who offer paid sick leave to
employees who meet COVID-19 eligibility standards.41
I conclude in Part V with policy suggestions.42 First, the Americans with
Disabilities Act could be amended to legislate an employee right to wear a
mask at work unless the employer proves, under the statute, that this is an
undue hardship.43 Second, an Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) rule that provides a narrow right of work refusal could be broadened
to include not only hazards that pose immediate physical safety threats44 but
also invisible exposures that are associated with cancer and other life-threatening conditions. 45 Third, to remedy the gender bias in work refusal laws that
protect miners, construction workers, and truck drivers, I suggest that sexual
and racial assaults—covered by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act—be
treated as protected forms of work refusal when employees quit to avoid these
assaults.46 Fourth, I point out that while gig work is growing, government
surveys fail to include gig workers in an annual census of workplace injuries
because these workers are not formally designated as employees.47 I suggest
that legislation be considered to extend current work refusal protections to gig
workers.48
Part VI is an Appendix of the cases listed by federal and state court opinions.49
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
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See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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II. A TYPOLOGY OF WORK REFUSAL SAFETY LAWS
Employment-at-will, a common law doctrine, provides employers freedom to end an employment relationship.50 This doctrine eroded with the advent of discrimination laws that specified unlawful grounds for terminating a
person’s employment.51 A right of work refusal is also contextualized outside
of safety laws.52 Unemployment laws generally disqualify claimants who
leave work voluntarily53 or engage in misconduct.54 My research shows, however, that some administrative agencies55 and courts56 treat work refusal due
to personal safety concerns as valid claims for unemployment.57 Also, courts
have developed a workplace tort called wrongful discharge58 and have fashioned a narrow doctrine—called the “public policy exception to employment
at will”—that affords legal protection to employees who refuse to violate a

50. See H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT §134, at 272 (1877)
(“With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if
the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof . . . .
[I]t is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in this respect there is no
distinction between domestic and other servants.”). For a common law example, see Payne v. W. &
Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884) (“Railroad corporations have in this matter the same right
enjoyed by manufacturers, merchants, lawyers[,] and farmers. All may dismiss their employ[e]es atwill, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause[,] or even for cause morally wrong, without
being thereby guilty of legal wrong . . . . They have the right to discharge their employe[e]s. The law
cannot compel them to employ workmen, nor to keep them employed.”).
51. See Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 920 (1981). “In recent years, there have
been established by statute a variety of limitations upon the employer’s power of dismissal. Employers
are precluded, for example, from terminating employees for a variety of reasons, including union
membership or activities, race, sex, age[,] or political affiliation.” Id.
52. See Jones v. Illinois Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 657 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (1995) (“[S]ection 601(A)
provides that ‘an individual shall be ineligible for benefits because he left work voluntarily without
good cause attributable to the employing unit.’”).
53. Burke v. Bd. of Rev., 477 N.E.2d 1351, 1358 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985).
54. See infra notes 114–19 and accompanying text.
55. See Odyssey Cap. Grp., L.P., 337 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2002) (detailing a decision by the National
Labor Relations Board regarding three apartment maintenance workers who refused work due to concerns about airborne asbestos and engaged in concerted activity).
56. See infra note 112 and accompanying text (holding that claimant’s actions did not constitute
misconduct as he had an objectively reasonable belief that his assignment endangered his life and
safety).
57. See Odyssey, 337 N.L.R.B. at 1116.
58. See infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text.
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law,59 or who report a violation of a law.60 I show how these cases arise in
certain work refusal situations.61 For the discussion in Section II.A, Chart A
explicates the main features of federal and state work refusal statutes.62
Chart A: Typology of Work Refusal Laws
Statute
Common Law
Federal
1. General Regulation
3. Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Rulings
• Occupational Safety and
• Steelworkers Trilogy
Health Act, 29 C.F.R.
(United Steelworkers of
1977.12(b)(2) (2020) (private
American v. Warrior &
and public sector)
Gulf
Navigation Co., 363
• National Labor Relations Act,
U.S.
574 (1960); United
as amended by the Labor ManSteelworkers
of America
agement Relations Act, June
v.
American
Manufactur23, 1947, ch.120, 61 Stat. 156,
ing Co., 363 U.S. 564
codified at 29 U.S.C. §143 (pri(1960);
and United Steelvate sector)
workers
of America. v.
• The Families First Coronavirus
Enterprise
Wheel & Car
Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116Corp.,
363
U.S. 593
127 (2020), including the
(1960))
Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act,
29 C.F.R. § 826.20 (2020)
Industry Regulation
• The Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-164 (1977)
• Federal Railroad Safety Act,
49 U.S.C. §20109 (1994)
• Protection of Seamen Against

59.
60.
61.
62.
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Borden v. Amoco Coastwise Trading Co., 985 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Wash. 1989).
See infra Section III.B.5 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.A.
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Discrimination, 46 U.S.C.
§ 2114(a)(1)(B)
• Surface and Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97–
424, 96 Stat. 2097
State

2. General Regulation
• Michigan Occupational Health
and Safety Act, M.C.L.
§ 408.1001 (1975)
• CAL. LAB. CODE § 6311 (West
1973)
• WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296360-150 (1980)
• State Unemployment Insurance
(disqualification standards)

4. Unjust Dismissal/Wrongful Discharge
• Tort (Public Policy Exception to Employment-atWill)

A. Federal Work Refusal Laws
1. Statutes
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as Amended by the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). In 1947, Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act by passing the Labor Management Relations Act, also
called the Taft–Hartley Act.63 While the statute enacted limits on strikes,64 it
carved out an exception in Section 502 for an employee’s refusal to work under dangerous conditions.65 The law states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require an individual employee to render labor or service without his
63. National Labor Relations Act, amended by Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act,
ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); see supra Chart A, Cell
1.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(4) (prohibiting strikes unless notice of intent to strike occurs and time limits
are met).
65. Id.
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consent . . . nor shall the quitting of labor by an employee or
employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous
conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed a strike under this chapter.66
In vague terms, Section 502 regulates work refusal by employees who are
subject to abnormally dangerous conditions.67 Nonetheless, the scope of this
privilege is unclear because “abnormally dangerous conditions” and “quitting
. . . in good faith” are ambiguous.68 Federal courts have done little to clarify
these terms.69 In Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, the
Supreme Court stated in dictum that a Section 502 work stoppage is protected
only when a union presents “ascertainable, objective evidence . . . that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists.”70 Cases arise infrequently under Section 502.71
Occupational Safety and Health Act. Congress passed the Occupational
Safety and Health (OSH) Act of 1970 “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the [n]ation safe and healthful working conditions.”72
The Act encourages employers and employees to reduce workplace hazards
and provides procedures for reporting occupational safety and health concerns
to OSHA.73 The purpose of the OSH Act is to prevent and abate hazards in

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See infra Part V.
70. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 386–87 (1974).
The Court was confronted with the issue of whether there is federal jurisdiction to enjoin a safety strike
and compel arbitration of a union’s complaint about abnormally dangerous working conditions. Id.
Although the Court ruled that the dispute was arbitrable under the labor agreement, it stated in dictum
its view that a Section 502 work stoppage is protected only when a union presents “ascertainable,
objective evidence . . . that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists.” Id. at 387.
71. See, e.g., Airborne Freight Corp. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Loc. 705, 216 F. Supp. 2d 712,
713–16 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (involving union-represented employees who engaged in a safety strike that
lasted several hours over a supervisor who displayed racist attitudes and battered a worker, as well as
the employer’s denial of water to workers during a hot day); Odyssey Cap. Grp., L.P., 337 N.L.R.B.
1110, 1114–17 (2002) (concerning three apartment maintenance workers who refused work due to
concerns about airborne asbestos and engaged in concerted activity).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1), (10).
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the workplace.74 Thus, the law provides a broad scope of worker safety
rights.75
The OSH Act prohibits employers from retaliating or otherwise discriminating against employees for exercising safety rights, including reporting or
testifying in connection to their complaint.76 More specifically, the law provides to employees a sequence of procedures when they confront imminently
dangerous work conditions: a right to request an OSHA inspection,77 to assist
in this inspection,78 to participate in a judicial proceeding,79 and to bring an
action to compel the Secretary of Labor to enforce the OSH Act.80 In 1973,
the Secretary of Labor promulgated a work refusal rule that added to this sequence of employee reporting of potentially deadly working conditions.81 In
the event that employee reporting was futile, this rule stated narrow conditions
for an employee to refuse an assigned task because of a reasonable apprehension of death or serious injury.82 The Supreme Court upheld the rule as a valid

74. See Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., 32 F.3d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1994).
75. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (2020) (discussing conduct explicitly and implicitly protected under
the OSH Act); 29 C.F.R. § 1904.36 (2020) (prohibiting retaliation for reporting workplace injury).
76. See 29 U.S.C.A § 660(c) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee for exercising rights
under OSH Act).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2), (e), (f)(2).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 662(d).
81. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (2020).
82. The rule is stated in 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2):
However, occasions might arise when an employee is confronted with a choice
between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious injury
or death arising from a hazardous condition at the workplace. If the employee,
with no reasonable alternative, refuses in good faith to expose himself to the
dangerous condition, he would be protected against subsequent discrimination.
The condition causing the employee’s apprehension of death or injury must be
of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the circumstances then confronting the employee, would conclude that there is a real danger of death or
serious injury and that there is insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement
channels. In addition, in such circumstances, the employee, where possible,
must also have sought from his employer, and been unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous condition.
Id. at § 1977.12(b)(2).
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exercise of authority under the OSH Act.83
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. A massive explosion
killed seventy-eight West Virginia coal miners in 1968.84 This led to passage
of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act (CMHSA or Coal Act).85 The
CMHSA contained a nondiscrimination provision for miners who refused
work once they notified their supervisor of a dangerous working condition.86
In 1977, Congress amended the CMHSA and titled it the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Amendments Act of 1977 (FMSHA or Mine Act).87
This law’s main purpose is to protect coal miners.88 The Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA), an agency within the Department of Labor,
enforces the law.89 The Mine Act affords protection to miners who refuse to

83. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 3–4, 22 (1980) (“[A]mong the rights that the Act so
protects is the right of an employee to choose not to perform his assigned task because of a reasonable
apprehension of death or serious injury coupled with a reasonable belief that no less drastic alternative
is available.”); Donovan v. Com. Sewing, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 548, 553 (D. Conn. 1982) (involving an
employee who experienced headaches and nausea when exposed to a type of glue used by the employer
for a project and, after asking about the glue’s contents, left work early and was then wrongfully discharged).
84. S. REP. NO. 91-411, at 6 (1969), reprinted in S. COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, 91ST
CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT OF 1969, at
132 (1978).
85. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975)). See also Section 105(c)(1) of the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1).
86. The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975)). Section 110(b) of the 1969
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act included a nondiscrimination provision for miners when
notifying the Secretary or his authorized representative of any alleged violation or danger. Id. At least
two appellate court opinions viewed this language as protecting miners from discharge if they notified
their supervisor of an unsafe condition and refused to work. See Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine
Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Munsey v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202, 1205
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
87. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act), Pub. L. No. 95–164, 91 Stat. 1290.
88. S. REP. NO. 95-181, (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3401, 3417.
Under this legislation, operators would have the duty to furnish miners places
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or
likely to cause death or harm to miners . . . . The purpose is to require the
elimination of recognized hazards that are not specifically covered by a standard.
Id.
89. Mine Safety and Health Administration, 29 U.S.C. § 557(a).
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work because of hazardous conditions.90 Its legislative history reflected an
understanding that the right to refuse unsafe work was “essential,” and therefore the law provided “[t]he right to refuse work under conditions that a miner
believes in good faith to threaten his health and safety.”91
The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. The Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) was enacted in 1982 as part of a comprehensive infrastructure funding law.92 The law contained legal protections
against retaliation and discrimination for employees in trucking and related
occupations when the employee has a good faith belief that working conditions present “reasonable apprehension of serious injury to the employee or

90. See id.
91. 123 CONG. REC. 20,043 (1977). See generally S. REP. NO. 95–181, at 35–36 (1977), reprinted
in S. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1977, at 623–24 (1978). The record
states:
MR. CHURCH. I wonder if the distinguished chairman would be good enough
to clarify a point concerning section 10[5](c), the discrimination clause.
It is my impression that the purpose of this section is to [e]nsure that miners
will play an active role in the enforcement of the act by protecting them against
any possible discrimination which they might suffer as a result of their actions
to afford themselves . . . the protection of the act.
It seems to me that this goal cannot be achieved unless miners faced with conditions that they believe threaten their safety or health have the right to refuse
to work without fear of reprisal. Does the committee contemplate that such a
right would be afforded under this section?
MR. WILLIAMS. The committee intends that miners not be faced with the
Hobson’s choice of deciding between their safety and health or their jobs.
The right to refuse work under conditions that a miner believes in good faith to
threaten his health and safety is essential if this act is to achieve its goal of a
safe and healthful workplace for all miners.
MR. JAVITS. I think the chairman has succinctly presented the thinking of the
committee on this matter. Without such a right, workers acting in good faith
would not be able to afford themselves their rights under the full protection of
the act as responsible human beings.
Id. at 1088–89; see also Miller v. FMSHRC, 687 F.2d 194, 195 (7th Cir.1982) (“[S]o clear a statement
in the principal committee report is powerful evidence of legislative purpose.”).
92.. See Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097; see also
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-84-2, THE SURFACE TRANSPORTATION ASSISTANCE ACT
OF 1982: COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY i (1984),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/141354.pdf (containing a succinct explanation of the STAA).
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the public because of the vehicle’s hazardous safety or security condition.”93
Federal Railroad Safety Act. Congress enacted the Federal Railroad
Safety Act (FRSA) “to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and
reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents.”94 The law prohibits railroads
from discriminating against employees for engaging in safety-related activities.95 The law applies to employees who have a good faith belief that work
presents conditions of imminent death or serious injury.96
Families First Coronavirus Response Act. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) was enacted shortly after the COVID-19 pandemic emerged in the United States.97 It contained the Emergency Paid Sick
Leave Act (EPSLA), a law that has been invoked in situations where an employee delayed work or refused work due to personal health concerns related
to the virus.98 The EPSLA provided paid leave for a variety of personal and
family reasons, including provisions that pertained specifically to the health
of the employee:
(1) An Employer shall provide to each of its Employees Paid
Sick Leave to the extent that Employee is unable to work due
to any of the following reasons: (i) [t]he Employee is subject
to a [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local quarantine or isolation order
related to COVID-19; (ii) [t]he Employee has been advised
by a [healthcare] provider to self-quarantine due to concerns
93. 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(B)(ii). In Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., the Supreme Court observed that Section 405 of the STAA “protects employees in the commercial motor transportation
industry from being discharged in retaliation for refusing to operate a motor vehicle that does not
comply with applicable state and federal safety regulations or for filing complaints alleging such noncompliance.” Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 255 (1987).
94. 49 U.S.C. § 20101.
95. 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a).
96. 49 U.S.C. § 20109(b)(1)(B). A railroad carrier may not “discharge, demote, suspend, reprimand, or in any other way discriminate against an employee for . . . refusing to work when confronted
by a hazardous safety or security condition related to the performance of the employee’s duties” if
certain prerequisite conditions exist. Id. Work refusal is only protected when an employee has a good
faith belief that “the hazardous condition presents an imminent danger of death or serious injury,” “the
urgency of the situation does not allow sufficient time to eliminate the danger without such refusal,”
and the employee has notified the railroad of the hazard. 49 U.S.C. § 20109(b)(2).
97. See Families First Coronavirus Response Act, PUB. L. NO. 116-127 (2020).
98. 29 C.F.R. § 826.20(a)(1) (2020) (listing situations where an employee can get paid sick leave)
(expired 2020).
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related to COVID-19; (iii) [t]he Employee is experiencing
symptoms of COVID-19 and seeking medical diagnosis
from a [healthcare] provider; . . . or (vi) [t]he Employee has
a substantially similar condition as specified by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor.99
Under the EPSLA, a qualifying full-time employee was entitled to a maximum of eighty hours of paid sick leave.100 The emergency law also prohibited an employer “from discharging, disciplining, or discriminating against”
an individual who took paid sick leave.101 Notably, however, the law expired
on December 31, 2020.102
2. Common Law
When union-represented employees refuse to work, employers may see
this as an unauthorized work stoppage.103 Traditionally, collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs) have included union assurances that they will not strike
in exchange for access to arbitration.104 As a result of Supreme Court precedent, a federal common law has evolved in interpreting labor agreements.105
99. 29 C.F.R. § 826.20(a)(1) (2020).
100. 29 C.F.R. § 826.21(a)(1) (2020).
101. 29 C.F.R. § 826.150(a) (2020) (including Prohibited Acts and Enforcement under the EPSLA).
102. Families First Coronavirus Response Act: Questions and Answers, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/pandemic/ffcra-questions (last visited Oct. 25, 2021) (“The requirement that employers provide paid sick leave and expanded family and medical leave under the
Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) expired on Dec. 31, 2020.”).
103. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 372 (1974) (involving a coal company that viewed miners’ refusal to work until air flow returned to normal as an
unauthorized strike under the collective bargaining agreement).
104. See ARCHIBALD COX, DEREK CURTIS BOK, ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN,
LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 717 (13th ed. 2001) (reporting that arbitration provisions reflecting this bargained exchange appear in about ninety-six percent of all labor agreements). Reflecting on Section 301 of the LMRA, Justice Douglas remarked in Textile Workers Union of America v.
Lincoln Mills of Alabama, “Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo
for an agreement not to strike.” 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
105. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960) (“In our role of
developing a meaningful body of law to govern the interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, we think special heed should be given to the context in which collective bargaining agreements are negotiated and the purpose which they are intended to serve.”).
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This body of precedent includes the Steelworkers Trilogy,106 a series of rulings
that announced principles of judicial deference to the arbitration process as
well as the awards rendered by labor arbitrators.107 As Chart A, Cell 3 shows,
some work refusal cases arise under this body of federal common law.
B. State Work Refusal Laws
1. Statutes
In Chart A, state safety statutes are summarized in Cell 2, while the primary common law element in work refusal cases is shown in Cell 4. The
following discussion provides elaboration.
State Work Safety Statutes. Some states have work safety laws that are
patterned after federal laws.108 These laws cover mine safety,109 public sector
employee safety,110 specific workplace hazards,111 as well as more general
supplements to federal OSHA regulations.112 State laws protect certain forms
106. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
107. See Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596 (“The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration
award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. The federal policy
of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits
of the awards.”).
108. See Cal/OSHA, CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. REL., https://www.dir.ca.gov/dosh/ (last visited Oct. 10,
2021) (providing an example of California’s work safety laws, which are patterned after federal laws).
109. See, e.g., Coal Mining Act, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705 (2009); Mining Safety Standards, 805
KY. ADMIN. REGS. 3 (2021); 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 69.207(a) (1991); Coal Mine Safety Act, VA.
CODE ANN. § 45.1-161.7 (repealed 2021); Miners’ Health, Safety and Training, W. VA. CODE § 22A
(1994).
110. See, e.g., Safety and Health Standards for Public Employees, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 27-a (Consol.
2021).
111. See, e.g., Puffer’s Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 14–15 (1st Cir. 1984) (discussing
a Massachusetts statute regulating elevator doors to increase safety); see also Env’t Encapsulating
Corp. v. City of New York, 666 F. Supp. 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (reviewing City of New York’s
asbestos handling regulations), rev’d in part, 855 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988); Associated Builders v. Miami-Dade County, 534 F.3d 1321, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2010) (reviewing a Florida ordinance that mandated wind load standards).
112. See, e.g., Division of Occupational Safety and Health, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-368 (West
2017); Michigan Occupational Health and Safety Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 408.1001–.1085(a)
(1974); Oregon Safe Employment Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 654.001–.295, .412–.423, .750–.780, .991
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of work refusal due to safety concerns.113
Unemployment Statutes. State unemployment insurance programs are
funded through coordination with federal policies.114 Their purpose is “reducing the hardship of unemployment.”115 Claims are generally allowed for “persons who become unemployed through no fault of their own.”116 However,
when unemployment results from a person’s misconduct, a state has grounds
to deny a claim for benefit.117 Some states limit these grounds for disqualification to “wrongful intent or evil design,”118 while others broaden misconduct
standards to include employee dishonesty.119
These standards for voluntary quitting and misconduct create ambiguity

(1973).
113. See, e.g., Mangini v. Penske Logistics, No. 11-0270 (NLH/KMW), 2012 WL 4609890, at *4
(D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2012) (discussing the allowance of work refusal for safety reasons under New Jersey
Conscientious Employee Protection Act); Lee v. Ardagh Glass, Inc., No. 14-cv-0759, 2015 WL
251858, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2015) (hearing an argument that an employer violated the California
Labor Code by terminating an employee for refusing to work when he felt unsafe); Hartnett v. New
York City Transit Auth., 657 N.E.2d 773, 773 (N.Y. 1995); Davis v. Kitt Energy Corp., 365 S.E.2d
82, 86 (W. Va. 1987).
114. Jenkins v. Bowling, 691 F.2d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1982) offers a succinct summary of the
federal–state relationship in unemployment insurance:
Though administered at the state level in accordance with criteria for eligibility
largely determined by each state, unemployment insurance is partly financed
by the federal government, which naturally has attached some strings to its largesse. The two strings that are relevant to this case are [S]ections 303(a)(1) and
(3) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §[] 503(a)(1), (3).
Id.
115. Gibson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 509 P.2d 945, 948 (Cal. 1973).
116. Jones v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 657 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“[S]ection 601(A)
provides that ‘[a]n individual shall be ineligible for benefits [because] he left work voluntarily without
good cause attributable to the employing unit.’” (quoting 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/601(A) (1992))).
117. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 96.5(2) (West 2020) (stating that individuals are disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits if they were discharged for misconduct).
118. Jackson v. Bd. of Rev. of the Dep’t of Lab., 475 N.E.2d 879, 885 (Ill. 1985) (“‘[M]isconduct’
. . . is limited to conduct evincing such wi[l]lful or wanton disregard of an employer’s interests as is
found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right
to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest
equal culpability, wrongful intent[,] or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard
of the employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties and obligations to his employer.” (quoting
Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 296 N.W. 636, 640 (Wis. 1941))).
119. Johnson v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 680 So. 2d 1073, 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(“[D]ishonesty is and should be grounds for dismissal and denial of benefits . . . .”).
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for certain work refusal cases.120 Employers object to payment of claims on
grounds that an employee quit work and was therefore ineligible.121 In other
cases, employers object to payment of claims on grounds that the employee
engaged in misconduct related to loss of their job.122 A new rule by President
Biden’s Administration, which sets standards for funding unemployment insurance programs, disallows employer objections to claims when an employee
is fired for actions related to avoiding COVID-19.123

120. See id.; Jackson, 475 N.E.2d at 885.
121. See Long v. Traughber, No. 1380, 1991 WL 25917, at *1, *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1991)
(reversing denial of a terminated employee’s claim for unemployment benefits for allegedly voluntarily quitting, stating: “[W]e cannot agree that the appellant’s refusal to work amounted to a wrongdoing
which violated a duty owed to his employer, nor can we agree that the appellant’s refusal to work at
the Oak Ridge site constituted a voluntary termination of employment. An employee’s obligation and
duty is to work at a time and a place where he is called upon to work by his employer[;] however,
there is a corollary duty on the part of the employer to provide working conditions which are not
dangerous or detrimental to health.”). The employer had terminated the employee for refusing to
return to a work site due to concern regarding radiation exposure. Id. at *1.
122. See Miss. Emp. Sec. Comm’n v. Phillips, 562 So. 2d 115, 116 (Miss. 1990) (ruling that an
employee who was discharged for refusing to work on a potential blow-out on an Exxon oil drilling
rig in the Gulf of Mexico held an objectively reasonable belief that the assignment endangered his life
and safety, thus his “actions did not constitute misconduct,” and he was entitled to unemployment
benefits).
123. See EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN. ADVISORY SYS., DEP’T OF LAB., LETTER NO. 16-20, CHANGE
5, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM (2021), https://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL_16-20_Change_5.pdf (“[T]he Department hereby establishes additional COVID-19
related reasons under which an individual may self-certify to establish eligibility for [Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA)]. These additional COVID-19 related reasons are described below . . . . [They include individuals] who refuse to return to work that is unsafe or accept an offer of
new work that is unsafe.”). The U.S. Department of Labor is issuing guidance to state unemployment
insurance agencies that expands the number of instances in which workers may be eligible for PUA.
Id. The Department of Labor stated that a person could self-certify under this COVID-19 related
reason:
The individual has been denied continued unemployment benefits because the
individual refused to return to work or accept an offer of work at the worksite
that, in either instance, is not in compliance with local, state, or national health
and safety standards directly related to COVID-19. This includes, but is not
limited to, those related to facial mask wearing, physical distancing measures,
or the provision of personal protective equipment consistent with public health
guidance.
Id.
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2. Common Law
In general, states recognize employment-at-will, which grants an employer the right to discharge an employee for any reason or no reason.124
However, most states provide a common law exception for the tort of
wrongful dismissal.125 This includes torts for wrongful discharge when an
employee’s termination violates a public policy.126 This tort stems from an
employer’s common law duty to provide a safe workplace.127 A separate tort
exists for exercising a statutory right to report a safety problem that imperils
an employee’s safety.128
III. RESEARCH METHODS AND FINDINGS
Section III.A explains the methodology for this study. Section III.B presents findings in five stages: (1) the sample and its primary characteristics
followed by fact findings; (2) total rulings won by employees and by
124. See, e.g., Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1996) (“Under the common
law, at-will employees could quit or be fired for any reason.”). In recent years, courts have created
certain exceptions to the terminable-at-will doctrine. Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Wash.
1989). One of these exceptions says employees may not be discharged for reasons that contravene
public policy. Id. Almost every state has recognized this public policy exception. Id. These public
policy tort actions have generally been allowed in four different situations: (1) where employees are
fired for “refusing to commit an illegal act”; (2) where employees are fired for “performing a public
duty or obligation,” such as serving on a jury; (3) where employees are fired for exercising “a legal
right or privilege,” such as filing workers’ compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired in
retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., “whistleblowing.” Id. at 1007.
125. 1 HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.13–.63, at 26–66
(John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 3d ed.1992) (giving an exhaustive state-by-state survey of wrongful discharge actions).
126. See Unger v. City of Mentor, 387 F. App’x 589, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2010) (“To state [a claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy], a plaintiff must plausibly allege that: (1) a clear
public policy existed, manifested in a state or federal constitution, statute, or administrative regulation
(clarity element); (2) dismissing employees under such circumstances would jeopardize the public
policy (jeopardy element); (3) conduct related to the public policy motivated the dismissal (causation
element); and (4) the employer lacked an overriding legitimate business justification (justification element).”).
127. See Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352 (1943) (noting that “at common law the duty of
the employer to use reasonable care in furnishing his employees with a safe place to work was plain”).
128. See Kohrt v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 364 F.3d 894, 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that
a statutory provision “encouraging employees to work toward high safety standards” creates a public
policy against discharging employees for voicing safety concerns).
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employers in their first and second rounds of adjudication; (3) a subset of rulings sorted by type of risk of serious injury or death followed by fact findings;
(4) a subset of rulings sorted by type of occupation followed by fact findings;
and (5) a subset of rulings won by employees and by employers in their first
and second rounds of adjudication sorted by law followed by fact findings.
Throughout these empirical snapshots, I compare the 109 work refusal rulings
prior to COVID-19 and the twelve cases involving work refusal stemming
from employee concerns about COVID-19.
A. Research Methods and Sample
I created a database of federal and state rulings from courts and administrative agencies on work refusal disputes. I started my investigation in
Westlaw’s internet database by using various search combinations with
“work” and “refus!”. I also used leading cases on work refusal, Gateway Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers of America129 and Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall.130
In 2021, I applied this method to search for COVID-19 work refusal cases.131
Once I found appropriate cases, I explored precedents cited by these decisions
and keycited cases for additions to my list. Some cases contained more nuanced forms of employee resistance such as delay,132 objection or complaint,133 or a strike.134 These cases were added if work was delayed and
129. 414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974).
130. 445 U.S. 1, 22 (1980).
131. See infra Section III.B.
132. See generally Robinette, 3 FMSHRC 803 (1981); Leeco, Inc. v. Hays, 965 F.2d 1081 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); Mitchell v. TAC Tech. Servs., Inc., 734 N.E.2d 1198 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
133. See generally Collins v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1388 (6th Cir.
1994); Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 133 F.3d 920 (4th Cir.
1997); Sisk v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 878 F.2d 1436 (6th Cir. 1989); Acosta v.
Jardon & Howard Techs., Inc., No. 18-CV-16-D, 2018 WL 5779506 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 2, 2018); Perez
v. E. Awning Sys., Inc., No. 15-cv-01692, 2018 WL 4926447 (D. Conn. filed Oct. 10, 2018); Perez v.
Clearwater Paper Corp., 184 F. Supp. 3d 831 (D. Idaho 2016); Perez v. Lear Corp. Eeds & Interiors
& Renosol Seating, LLC, No. 15-0205-CG-M , 2015 WL 2131282, (S.D. Ala. May 7, 2015), vacated
822 F.3d 556 (11th Cir. 2016); Perez v. U.S. Postal Serv., 76 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1173 (W.D. Wash.
2015); Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372 (Ill. 1985); Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal.
Rptr. 159 (Ct. App. 1982).
134. See generally Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Lenfest, 799 F.2d 795, 797 (1st Cir. 1986); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 342 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1965); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers, Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, No. 69 H 256, 1969 WL 326 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 17,
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contention arose from the worker’s complaint.
I developed a data-coding form for each case. This form had a heading
for the case citation, followed by variables such as private-sector or publicsector work, union represented or not, and individual or multiple plaintiffs. I
assigned a unique number for these variables (e.g., “1” if the employee was in
a union; “2” if the employee was not shown to be in a union; and “3” if the
employee was a contract worker in a workplace with union representation).
My data sheet continued with two sections for occupation and work-related risk.135 To gather data on job types and occupational risks associated
with work refusal disputes, I relied on two classifications used by the U.S.
Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). First, I used the BLS
classification for occupations in the agency’s reporting of workplace fatalities.136 BLS sorts occupations according to the following occupational
groups: (1) management; (2) business and financial operations; (3) computer
and mathematical; (4) architectural and engineering; (5) life, physical, and social science; (6) community and social services; (7) education, training, and
library; (8) legal; (9) arts and design; (10) entertainment, sports, and media;
(11) healthcare practitioners and technical; (12) healthcare support; (13) protective services; (14) food preparation and serving; (15) building and grounds
cleaning and maintenance; (16) personal care and service; (17) sales and related; (18) office and administrative support; (19) farming, fishing, and forestry; (20) construction and extraction; (21) installation, maintenance, and repair; (22) production; and (23) transportation and material moving.137 I coded
cases to match the job of the employee who engaged in work refusal to an
occupational group in the BLS survey.138
1969), aff’d, 447 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1971); Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
of Rev., 195 A.2d 138 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n,
Int’l, 206 N.Y.S.2d 98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960); E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 63 A.2d 371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1949).
135. See infra Table 1.
136. TABLE A-5: Fatal Occupational Injuries by Occupation and Event or Exposure, All United
States, 2019, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftb0332.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
137. Id.
138. Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/statistics (last visited Oct.
11, 2021) (providing that the Bureau of Labor Statistics is the “principal fact-finding agency for the
federal government in the field of labor, economics, and statistics” and “[p]rovides data on employment, wages, inflation, productivity, and many other topics”).
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BLS also classifies risks associated with occupational injuries.139 The
main headings for this survey of risks include (1) violence; (2) transportation;
(3) fire and explosion; (4) fall, slip, or trip; (5) exposure to harmful substances;
(6) contact with objects or equipment; (7) overexertion or bodily reaction; (8)
containers, furniture, and fixtures; (9) machinery; (10) parts and materials;
(11) persons, plants, animals, and minerals; (12) structures and surfaces; (13)
tools, instruments, and equipment; and (14) other.140 While most cases had
only one risk, some cases had two or more risk factors.141 I assigned a dominant risk for each case.142
I coded results for first-round rulings through fourth-round rulings.143 I
treated an agency ruling the same as a court’s ruling.144 A variable had scores
for (1) employee wins all, (2) employee wins part, and (3) employer wins all.
Separately, I coded rulings by the winners of procedural motions and the winners of merits rulings.
My coding extended to types of laws raised by employees in work refusal
cases, including (1) LMRA, (2) OSH Act, (3) other federal safety laws, (4)
state OSH acts, (5) other state safety laws, (6) collective bargaining agreements, (7) unemployment insurance, (8) tort (wrongful discharge), and (9)
COVID-19 safety provisions in FFCRA (EPSLA).145
139. Table 2. Fatal Occupational Injuries for Selected Events or Exposures, 2015–19, U.S. BUREAU
LAB. STAT.: ECON. NEWS RELEASE, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.t02.htm (last visited
Oct. 11, 2021) (identifying violence, transportation, fire and explosion, fall, slip or trip, explosion,
exposure to harmful substances, and contact with objects or equipment as broad risk elements).
140. Id.
141. See Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857, 862 (9th Cir.1987) (involving employees who
were discharged after refusing to fill generators with gasoline under unsafe conditions).
142. See infra Section III.B.
143. For the small number of cases with more than four rounds of rulings, I counted the most recent
ruling as the fourth and worked back three more rulings. See, e.g., Wolfgram v. Emp. Sec. Agency,
291 P.2d 279, 279–82 (Idaho 1955) (ruling the employee was not eligible for unemployment benefits
after five rounds of rulings). Thus, in a tiny fraction of cases, a first ruling was actually a ruling based
on an appeal of an even earlier ruling. This tended to occur in unemployment cases.
144. How Laws Are Made: The Administrative Agencies, UNIV. OF GA. SCH. OF L. (Sept. 1, 2021,
12:57 PM), https://libguides.law.uga.edu/fdlp_webinars (“Administrative agencies act both quasi-judicially and quasi-legislatively . . . . They act like a court when conducting hearings and issuing rulings
and decisions.”).
145. Some COVID-19 cases involved employees who were terminated for not following employer
safety guidelines—essentially a form of work refusal but not for safety reasons. Wells v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Norfolk/Richmond, LLC, 500 F. Supp. 3d 478, 481 (E.D. Va. 2020) (firing an employee
OF
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B. Research Findings
1. Risk, Occupation, and Year of First Ruling
Table 1
Work Refusal Cases (COVID-19 Cases in Parentheses)
Occupational Groups
Management
Business & Financial
Computer & Math
Architecture & Engineering
Life, Physical & Social Science
Community & Social Service
Legal
Education, Training & Library
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, Media
Healthcare Practice & Technical
Healthcare Support
Protective Service
Food Preparation & Serving
Building & Grounds Clean../Main.
Personal Care & Service
Sales & Related
Office & Administrative Support
Farming, Fishing & Forestry
Construction & Extraction
Install, Maintain & Repair
Production
Transportation/Material Moving

2
0
1
1
0
1 (1)
1 (1)
2 (1)
2
4
4 (2)
2 (2)
6 (2)
2 (1)
0
1
0
3
30
12
18
29 (2)

Year of First Ruling
First Quartile
(37 Years)
Second Quartile (9 Years)
Third Quartile (22 Years)
Fourth Quartile (10 Years)

1944–1980
1981–1989
1990–2011
2012–2021

Work Refusal Action
Refuse Work Order (1 Employee)

58 (1)

for refusing to get tested for COVID-19 and to disclose medical information related to his family
member who had tested positive for COVID-19). These were not included in my database.
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Refuse Work Order (2 or More Employees)
Strike
Delay or Stop Work (1 Employee)
Delay or Stop Work (2 or More Employees)
Complain/Report/Object
Quit

20
6
10 (6)
5
12 (3)
10 (2)

Source of Risk
Violence or Injuries by Persons or Animals
Transportation Incidents
Fire or Explosion
Fall, Slip, or Trip
Contact with Objects & Equipment
Overexertion & Bodily Reaction
Chemicals & Chemical Products
Containers, Furniture & Fixtures
Machinery
Parts & Materials
Persons, Plants, Animals, Minerals
Structures & Surfaces
Tools, Instruments & Equipment
Other

0
19
11
11
10
26 (16)
18
3
2
0
2
2
6
9

Claim of Legal Right
Labor Management Relations Act
Occupational Safety and Health Act
Other Federal Safety Law
State Safety Law
Collective Bargaining Agreement
Unemployment Claim
Tort (Public Policy Wrongful Discharge)
FFCRA, EPSLA (COVID-19)
ADA
PDA

99
9
14
35 (1)
5
4 (1)
24
20 (2)
6 (6)
2 (2)
1

Employer Action
Discharge
Discipline (Less Than Discharge)
Constructive Discharge
Allow Quit
Injunction
Other

84 (6)
11
8
13 (3)
3 (1)
2
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No Accommodation; Reopen; Operate

3 (3)

Table 1 summarizes the sample of 121 cases. This includes 109 cases
that began before COVID-19 and twelve cases that were filed after the onset
of the pandemic in the United States. The left-hand column of statistics combines the pre-COVID-19 and COVID-19 cases. The statistics in parentheses
break out the COVID-19 cases. This format allows an easy comparison of
similarities and differences.
First-round rulings from 1944–2021 were observed in federal and state
courts, as well as federal and state administrative law agencies. Cases arose
under a variety of statutes and torts, including the LMRA (9 cases), the OSH
Act (14 cases), more industry-specific federal safety laws (35 cases), state
safety laws (5 cases), a collective bargaining agreement (4 cases), unemployment laws (24 cases), the public policy tort of wrongful discharge (20 cases),
and the COVID-19 EPSLA for paid sick leave (6 cases).146
Employees engaged in work refusal actions alone (58 cases) or with two
or more employees (20 cases); engaged in a strike (6 cases); delayed work
alone (10 cases) or with two or more employees (5 cases); complained, objected, or reported a safety concern (12 cases); or quit (10 cases). Employer
reactions to work refusal included discharge (84 cases); discipline less than
discharge (11 cases); constructive discharge (8 cases); allowing the employee
to quit (13 cases); and seeking an injunction for an actual or imminent work
stoppage (3 cases).
Based on this overview of Table 1, I report key findings in the table’s
categories. I begin by reporting findings for occupations in work refusal
cases.
Finding 1.A (Overall): Work refusal cases were concentrated in industrial
sector occupations that involved mechanization of work: (1) construction and
extraction (30 cases); (2) transportation and moving material (29 cases); (3)
production (18 cases); and (4) installation, repair, and maintenance (12
cases).147
Finding 1.B (COVID-19): Although the sample had only twelve cases,
work refusal cases arose in seven different occupational groups. The pattern

146. See supra Table 1.
147. See supra Table 1.
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of cases shifted from industrial occupations to white-collar professional (community and social services; legal; and education, training, and library) and
service jobs (healthcare support; protective services; food preparation and
serving; and building cleaning).148
Finding 2.A (Overall): Work refusal cases were concentrated in 1981–
1989 and became less frequent until 2021.149
Finding 2.B (COVID-19): The number of work refusal cases exploded in
2021 with ten cases.150 In 1980, there were six work refusal cases, the next
highest number by year.151
Finding 3.A (Overall): The source of risk in work refusal cases was significantly concentrated in chemical exposure and transportation work situations.152 A smaller number of cases involved fire or explosion, slips and falls,
contact with equipment or objects, and overexertion or bodily reactions.153
Finding 3.B (COVID-19): Since the onset of COVID-19, the risk of bodily reaction as a cause for a work refusal case has surged.154 While this development appears to be unique since the first case in 1944, bodily reaction cases
for COVID-19 seem similar to cases involving chemicals and chemical products as a risk factor: both risk categories involve exposure to occupational
diseases.155
2. Winner of First-Round and Second-Round Rulings: 1981–1989 and
2020–2021
Tables 2.A and 2.B below present court rulings in 1981–1989 and eleven
cases in 2020–2021.156 The former group reflects the years comprising the
most concentrated quartile of cases; the latter reflects the current period with
its spike related to COVID-19 cases.157 Both timeframes have higher
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
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concentrations of cases. The red bars in each cluster represents employee
wins, while black bars show employer wins. Each year has a cluster of up to
four bars (e.g., 1982). The first two bars show first-round rulings per year,
followed by two bars for second-round rulings that year.

Rulings Won

Table 2.A
First & Second-Round Rulings by Year (1981–
1989):
Employee and Employer Wins
44

4

3

3 3
2

1 1
0 0
1981

1
1982

3

2

2

1

11 1
0

0 0

1983

1984

3
2
1 1 1

0
1985

1986

1987

1 1 1111
0 0
1988

1989

Year of Ruling
Employee Wins Round 1

Employer Wins Round 1

Employee Wins Round 2

Employer Wins Round 2

Linear (Employee Wins Round 1)

Linear (Employer Wins Round 1)
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Rulings Won

Table 2.B
First & Second-Round Rulings by Year (2020–
2021):
Employee and Employer Wins
4

3
1

0

1

1

0
2020

1
2021

Year of Ruling
Employee Wins Round 1

Split Wins

Employer Wins Round 1

Employee Wins Round 2

Split Wins 2

Employer Wins Round 2

Finding 4 (1981–1989): Employees had only one year when they won
more rulings than they lost. This occurred in second-round rulings in 1982,
when they won four rulings and employers won one ruling.
Finding 5 (1981–1989): Employer wins increased from 1983–1987 and
then declined.158 Employees won only five first-round rulings in this lengthy
period, compared to twelve first-round wins for employers. In second-round
rulings, employees won four rulings compared to eleven wins for employers.
The two trendlines in Table 2.A highlight the favorable pattern for employer
wins relative to employee wins.159
Finding 6 (2020–2021): Court rulings split evenly for employees and employers in this period.160 This trend, albeit with limited data, indicates more
wins for employees compared to the 1980s.161 However, given COVID-19’s
severity, the split in outcomes for employees and employers suggests that the

158.
159.
160.
161.
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paid sick leave law offered only modest protections for employees.162
3. Winner of First-Round and Second-Round Rulings by Risk
Table 3.A (pre-COVID-19) and Table 3.B (during COVID-19) present
court rulings, arranged in clusters, related to seven specific occupational risks
and a category for others. In Table 3.A, the first bar in each cluster represents
employee wins for first-round rulings (red bar).163 The second bar shows wins
for employers (black bar). The third and fourth bars, respectively, show employee and employer wins in the second round. Table 3.B reports only firstround rulings due to negligible second-round rulings for COVID-19 cases.164

162. See supra Table 2.B.
163. See infra Table 3.A.
164. See infra Table 3.B.
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Table 3.A
First & Second-Round Rulings by Type of Risk:
Employee and Employer Wins
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13

Type of Occupational Risk

Employee Wins Round 1

Employer Wins Round 1

Employee Wins Round 2

Employer Wins Round 2

Finding 7 (Pre-COVID-19 Cases): Employers won most rulings when
work refusal was connected to an occupational risk from transportation (thirteen wins to six wins for employers in first-round rulings); overexertion or
bodily reaction (eleven wins to three wins for employers in first-round rulings); and fall, slip, and trip risks (nine wins to two wins for employers in
first-round rulings).165
Finding 8 (Pre-COVID-19 Cases): Only one occupational risk led to an
even split of first-round rulings for employee wins and employer wins: chemical exposure (nine cases apiece).166
Finding 9 (Pre-COVID-19 Cases): Employees won all first-round and
second-round rulings in connection with a risk from contact with equipment
165. See supra Table 3.A.
166. See supra Table 3.A.
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or an object (ten wins in Round 1 and six wins in Round 2).167

Rulings Won

Table 3.B
First-Round Rulings by Type of Risk for
COVID-19 Cases:
Employee and Employer Wins
6
4
2
Exertion/Body
Type of Occupational Risk

Employee Wins Round 1

Spilt Rulings

Employer Wins

Finding 10 (COVID-19 Cases): In all twelve COVID-19 cases, the occupational risk was bodily reaction.168 Employees won all or part of the rulings
in six first-round rulings, while employers won rulings in the other six
cases.169 While the sample is small, it indicates a higher win rate for employees in bodily reaction cases involving work refusal compared to pre-COVID19 cases.170
4. Winner of First-Round and Second-Round Rulings by Occupation
Tables 4.A and 4.B present court rulings, arranged in clusters, related to
specific occupational groups for pre-COVID-19 and COVID-19 cases.171

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See supra Table 3.A.
See supra Table 3.B.
See supra Table 3.B.
See supra Tables 3.A, 3.B.
See infra Tables 4.A, 4.B.
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Table 4.A
First & Second-Round Rulings by Type of
Occupation:
Employee and Employer Wins
18
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Finding 11 (Pre-COVID-19 Cases): Employers won most rulings when
work refusal occurred in a transportation job (seventeen wins to nine wins for
employees in first-round rulings) or installation or maintenance (eleven wins
to one win for employees in first-round rulings).172
Finding 12 (Pre-COVID-19 Cases): Only one occupational group, production, had an even split of first-round rulings for employee and employer
172. See supra Table 4.A.
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wins (eight cases apiece).173
Finding 13 (Pre-COVID-19 Cases): Employees in construction or extraction won most rulings relating to work refusal (eighteen wins to twelve employer wins in first-round rulings and thirteen wins to ten employer wins in
second-round rulings).174

Table 4.B
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First-Round Rulings by Type of Occupation for
COVID-19 Cases:
Employee and Employer Wins

Occupation
Employee Wins Round 1

Partial Wins

Employer Wins Round 1

Finding 14 (COVID-19 Cases): COVID-19 work refusal cases show a
173. See supra Table 4.A.
174. See supra Table 4.A.
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marked change in affected occupations.175 None of the occupations in the preCOVID-19 sample, except for transportation, are reflected in Table 4.B.176 A
broad range of new occupations are in evidence: community and social services; legal; education and related jobs; healthcare support; protective services; food preparation and service; and building cleaning and maintenance.177
Notably, this marks a shift of work refusal cases to white-collar and servicesector jobs, away from the industrial jobs in the pre-COVID-19 period.
5. Winner of First-Round and Second-Round Rulings by Law
Tables 5.A and 5.B follow the same presentation with court rulings arranged by the type of law, except that third-round rulings are also reported to
account for unemployment and industry-safety laws that begin with an entrylevel administrative ruling and are appealed to a state board or commission
and eventually a court. Thus, there are six bars for each area of law.

175. Compare supra Table 4.B (listing the types of occupations affected by COVID-19), with supra
Table 4.A (listing the types of occupations previously affected by work refusal cases).
176. See supra Tables 4.A, 4.B.
177. See supra Table 4.B.
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Table 5.A (Pre-COVID-19)
First, Second & Third-Round Rulings by Type of
Law:
Employee and Employer Wins
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Finding 15 (Pre-COVID-19 Cases): Employees had the most success in
winning rulings involving industry-specific safety laws for mines, transportation, and railroads (shown as Misc. Fed. Law).178 In first-round rulings, employees and employers won seventeen cases apiece. However, in secondround rulings, employees won fifteen rulings, compared to nine wins for employers.179 In third-round rulings, employees and employers won nine rulings

178. See supra Table 5.A.
179. See supra Table 5.A.
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apiece.180
Finding 16 (Pre-COVID-19 Cases): Unemployment had a large swing in
rulings from the first to third rounds.181 Employers were mostly successful
when they challenged unemployment claims from former employees who refused injurious work.182 Employers won thirteen cases in the first round and
also the second round, while employees won only seven cases in the first and
second rounds.183 However, these results changed in third-round rulings,
where employees won eleven rulings, compared to five wins for employers.184
Finding 17 (Pre-COVID-19 Cases): The biggest swing in rulings occurred
for claims arising out of the public policy tort of wrongful discharge.185 Employers won most of these rulings in the first round by a wide margin, fourteen
cases to four cases for employees.186 This advantage was reversed in secondround rulings, where employees won nine rulings to five rulings for employers.187 There were only two third-round rulings.188 Employees won in both
cases.189

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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Table 5.B (COVID-19)
First & Second-Round Rulings by Type of Law:
Employee and Employer Wins

33
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Finding 18 (COVID-19 Cases): The FFCRA (EPSLA) was the most common work refusal law for COVID-19.190 Employees won just over half of first
and second-round rulings for EPSLA cases.191 The public policy tort provided
continuity of results in favor of employees, as these workers registered two
wins in first and second-round cases, while employers had no wins.192
IV. INTERPRETING THE FINDINGS
The paucity of cases in this study is likely due to restrictive legal protections for employees who encounter perilous work conditions, rather than
widely available safe working conditions. The LMRA only affords
190. See supra Table 5.B.
191. See supra Table 5.B.
192. See supra Table 5.B.

39

[Vol. 49: 1, 2022]

Refusing to Work To Avoid Serious Injury or Death
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

employees a vague protection, when their work conditions are “abnormally
dangerous.”193 Because mines are inherently dangerous, it takes an unusual
threat to life to successfully invoke this law.194 Similarly, the OSH Act rule
that provides employees a right to refuse work is mostly unusable, protecting
them from retaliation only after they have exhausted other ways to communicate and address their safety concerns.195 Laws for unemployment insurance
have no specific language for work refusal; however, their disqualification
standards include “willful . . . disregard of an employer’s interests,” a potential
impediment to successful claims because refusing a work assignment is a willful act.196 Employment-at-will offers workers a faster solution, permitting
them to avoid an imminent danger by seeking a new job.197 This practical
alternative probably limits work refusal litigation.198
The results also show a pre-COVID-19 spike in work refusal cases from
1981 through 1989.199 This period occurred shortly after the Supreme Court
said in dictum in 1974 that work refusal could be legally protected when there
is “ascertainable, objective evidence . . . that an abnormally dangerous condition for work exists200 and an OSHA rule in 1980.201 But the landmark rulings
in Gateway Coal and Whirlpool did not unleash a growth in employee wins
in work refusal cases, and the trends from the 1980s appear to have deterred
employees from bringing more cases.202
Other findings demonstrate a few pockets of specific strengths for work
refusal laws.203 Table 3.A shows that employees won rulings when risks from

193. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143.
194. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (2020).
195. Id. (delineating that employees, where possible, must have sought to try to eliminate the condition before refusal of work is legally protected).
196. Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 259 (1941); see also Jackson v. Bd. of Rev. of
Dep’t of Lab., 475 N.E.2d 879, 885 (Ill. 1985).
197. See Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash. 2d 931, 935 (1996) (holding an employee
may quit for no stated reason).
198. See id.
199. See infra Tables 1, 2.A, 2.B (providing data on amount of work refusal cases from 1981–1989).
200. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974).
201. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1980).
202. See supra Table 2.A.
203. See supra Table 3.A (showing employees have a better chance of winning work refusal cases
in fire, explosion, or contact equipment categories).
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contact or objects presented objective dangers.204 Cases included workers
who refused to grease a moving mining belt,205 refused to put their hands near
exposed blades,206 refused to use a polishing machine without guards,207 refused to change grates “on the fly,”208 refused to operate an unsafe saw
guide,209 refused to stay in a mine after a five-ton rock fell from a ceiling,210
refused to travel in a mine section with accumulating water,211 and refused to
work near an open electrified cable.212
Table 3.A also shows that courts ruled for employees who refused to work
when there was an objective risk of fire or explosion.213 Cases included an oil
rig worker who refused to cap a leaking well,214 a miner who refused to ignite
a drier in a taconite mine,215 a worker in a coal liquification plant who refused
to refuel gas in tanks that had not yet cooled and were located beneath sparks
from welders,216 a worker who refused to load scrap metal in a kettle where
his vehicle had no safety shield from splashing molten lead,217 a miner who
refused to continue to work as his crew advanced toward a mapped abandoned
mine, where penetration of a wall could lead to explosion, fire, or air with no
oxygen,218 and workers who refused to be hoisted 180 feet above the ground
to a narrow platform without guards or pad eyes to hook their safety

204. See supra Table 3.A (showing employees won rulings when risks from contact or objects presented objective dangers).
205. Leeco, Inc. v. Hays, 965 F.2d 1081, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
206. Martin v. H.M.S. Direct Mail Serv., Inc., 936 F.2d 108, 108 (2d Cir. 1991).
207. See Walt Indus. Inc., v. Dep’t of Lab., No. 180124, 1997 WL 33352761 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr.
11, 1997).
208. Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 464 F.2d 565, 567 (8th Cir. 1972).
209. See Webster v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 187 P.2d 527, 528 (Idaho 1947).
210. See Munsey v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1202, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
211. See S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 716 F.2d 1105, 1106 (6th
Cir. 1983).
212. Maggard, 8 FMSHRC 806, 806 (1986).
213. See supra Table 3.A (showing employees won more work refusal cases when there was an
objective risk of fire or explosion).
214. See Miss. Emp. Sec. Comm’n v. Phillips, 562 So. 2d 115, 117 (Miss. 1990).
215. Ottawa Silica Co. v. Sec’y of Lab., 780 F.2d 1022, 1022 (6th Cir. 1985).
216. Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1987).
217. Marshall v. N.L. Indus., 618 F.2d 1220, 1222 (7th Cir. 1980).
218. Simpson v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 842 F.2d 453, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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harnesses.219
However, Table 3.A shows a different pattern, too: employers won most
of the rulings involving invisible or latent risks to workers.220 These cases
included work refusal due to an employee’s concern about overexertion or a
bodily reaction—for example, a nurse who feared needle pricks from HIVpositive patients221 and another nurse who feared an adverse reaction to a flu
shot.222 Employers won cases where a truck driver,223 a railroad worker,224
and fish processing workers out at sea225 refused to work on safety grounds
related to their fatigue.226 Similarly, an employee was denied unemployment
benefits when he refused work due to his experience with long-term rashes
from exposure to conditions in a mine.227 An employee who refused to continue working in 110 degree heat while suffering from dehydration lost his
unemployment case,228 while a welder who complained about air quality and
breathing conditions in a confined space lost his wrongful discharge case.229
Unsurprisingly, Table 3.B shows that all of the COVID-19 cases involved
a risk of bodily reaction to the virus.230 The more salient point is that the cases

219. Brock ex rel. Parker v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 766 F.2d 469, 470 (11th Cir. 1985).
220. See supra Table 3.A.
221. Stepp v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 521 N.E.2d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
222. Rhodenbaugh v. Kan. Emp. Sec. Bd. of Rev., 372 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016).
223. Peery v. Rutledge, 355 S.E.2d 41, 43 (W. Va. 1987).
224. Laveing v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 19-CV-01095-CRE, 2020 WL 5768730, at *1–2 (W.D. Pa.
Aug. 21, 2020).
225. Cornelio v. Premier Pac. Seafoods, Inc., No. 54445-4-I, 2005 WL 1331205 (Wash. Ct. App.
May 23, 2005). The crewmembers were expected to work sixteen-hour days, seven days a week, and
many of them had previously worked as processors for Premier Pacific. Id. at *1. They understood
the harsh conditions they faced when they agreed to do the work. Id. Their wrongful discharge claim
required that they prove that the extra half hour in their daily work schedule created unreasonably
dangerous working conditions such that public policy required that they be allowed to refuse to work
without being discharged. Id. at *3.
226. See Peery, 355 S.E.2d 41; Laveing, 2020 WL 5768730; Cornelio, 2005 WL 1331205.
227. Wolfgram v. Emp. Sec. Agency, 291 P.2d 279, 300–01 (Wyo. 1955).
228. Hernandez v. Pitt Ohio Express, LLC, No. 11 CV 1507, 2012 WL 3496860 (N.D. Ohio Aug.
14, 2012).
229. Porter v. Reardon Mach. Co., 962 S.W.2d 932, 934–35 (Mo. Ct. App.1988). But see McCrocklin v. Emp. Dev. Dep’t, 205 Cal. Rptr. 156, 157 (Ct. App. 1984) (awarding unemployment benefits to
a worker who quit due to exposure to second-hand smoke, where the employee suffered tangible physical side effects and worried about his health and safety).
230. See supra Table 3.B.
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demonstrate the recklessness of some workplaces during the pandemic.231
Employees lost their jobs for refusing to break COVID-19 protocols ordered
by healthcare professionals.232 Other employees, some with serious COVID19 risk factors, faced adverse treatment after they avoided in-person work because their employer failed to take basic precautions to mitigate infection.233
Yet another employee was terminated for missing work while she was ill and
sought medical help to determine if she had COVID-19.234
231. See supra Table 3.B.
232. In Payne v. Woods Services, Inc., a residential counselor was fired for refusing to return to
work when he was instructed to remain in quarantine after testing positive for COVID-19. No. 204651, 2021 WL 603725, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2021). In Beltran v. 2 Deer Park Drive Operations
LLC, a building maintenance technician was terminated after he complied with a quarantine memo
relating to his mother’s positive COVID-19 test and failed to report to work during this period. No.
20-8454, 2021 WL 794745, at *3–*4 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2021). In Colombe v. SGN, Inc., an employee
whose husband was instructed to quarantine, along with all other family members, was fired for not
returning to work during this period and for not satisfying her employer’s concern that the quarantine
order did not have her name on it. No. 20-CV-374, 2021 WL 1198304, at *10 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29,
2021).
233. Smith v. Corecivic of Tenn. LLC, No. 20-cv-0808-L-DEB, 2021 WL 927357, at *2–5 (S.D.
Cal. Mar. 10, 2021) (involving a correctional officer who was at a higher risk for COVID-19 complications due to asthma and pneumonia and in March 2020 alleged that she was forced to quit because
her employer failed to provide a safe work environment to mitigate COVID-19 at its facilities by
having large group meetings and failing to provide masks); Peeples v. Clinical Support Options, Inc.,
487 F. Supp. 3d 56, 61 (D. Mass. 2020) (detailing an office manager who suffered from moderate
asthma, and who was ordered to return to work in a setting where personal protective equipment (PPE),
masks, hand sanitizer, and wipes were not always available, who then sued to enjoin her employer
from imminently firing her because she requested the reasonable accommodation of continued telecommuting); Brooks v. Corecivic of Tenn. LLC, No. 20cv0994 DMS, 2020 WL 5294614, at *5 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 4, 2020) (involving a detention officer, with risk factors for her race and obesity, who felt
compelled to resign after a supervisor ordered her to work without a mask, even after two hundred
thirty-four detainees and thirty staff members tested positive for the virus); Toro v. Acme Barricades,
L.C., No. 20-cv-1867-Orl-22, 2021 WL 616318, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2021) (consisting of an
employee with COVID-19 risk factors who was instructed by his doctor to work from home, then was
subsequently terminated for not reporting to work in his office); Chew v. Legislature of Ohio, 512 F.
Supp. 3d 1124, 1126–27 (D. Idaho 2021) (concerning two lawmakers with serious medical conditions—one with type II diabetes and hypertension and another with paraplegia that led to diminished
lung capacity—who sought telecommuting or self-contained work spaces as accommodations under
the Americans with Disabilities Act but were denied); Thornberry v. Powell Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 20271-DCR, 2020 WL 5647483, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2020) (involving a substance abuse counselor
at a detention center during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, who refused to come to work
unless her employer provided new precautions to mitigate the spread of the virus).
234. Valdivia v. Paducah Ctr. for Health & Rehab., LLC, 507 F. Supp. 3d 805, 808 (W.D. Ky. 2020)
(detailing a nurse who was fired after she was sent home with a fever, determined that she had a
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Turning to the relationships between types of jobs and win rates in work
refusal cases, the finding in Table 4—that mining and extraction employees
won a majority of cases—shows how work refusal laws that are tailored to an
industry’s extreme conditions can benefit workers.235 Discharged employees
won rulings after they refused an assignment that created risk from a ten-ton
trailing motor,236 refused to start an unsafe longwall mining machine,237 refused to work on a mine section with a cracked roof that later fell,238 refused
to load a coal truck above twenty-four tons,239 refused to work in an area of
trapped fumes,240 refused to light a gas drier with a handheld flame,241 and
refused to grease machinery that was running.242
Table 5.A, depicting the law in employee and employer wins, reinforces
my study’s primary finding that work refusal safety laws have only limited
value for employees.243 Employee success in appellate rulings for the public
policy tort of wrongful discharge and unemployment offer an intriguing perspective on the low value of worker safety laws.244 This tort, and this
stomach virus, sought confirmation that she was not infected with COVID-19, and then tried unsuccessfully to have her absence excused with a doctor’s note).
235. See supra Table 4.A.
236. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 795 F.2d 364, 365–66
(4th Cir. 1986) (involving a mine worker who was given a suspension for refusing a work assignment
that he believed endangered the safety of a coworker by exposing that person to a risk from a ten-ton
trailing motor).
237. Miller v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 687 F.2d 194, 196 (7th Cir. 1982).
238. Gilbert v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 866 F.2d 1433, 1435–36 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
239. Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, No. 97-1280, 1997 WL
794132, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 1997) (delineating a coal truck driver who was fired for refusing to
load his truck above the company’s minimum load requirement of twenty-four tons, claiming that this
weight was an unacceptable safety hazard).
240. Liggett Indus. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 923 F.2d 150, 152 (10th Cir.
1991) (involving welders who walked off the job after a miner named Begay voiced concerns about
his health being endangered by trapped fumes that were not addressed by his employer).
241. Ottawa Silicia Co. v. Sec’y of Lab., Mine Safety & Health Admin., No. 84-3859, 1985 WL
13948 (6th Cir. Nov. 11, 1985) (ruling in favor of a miner, ostensibly fired for using profanity, who
was fired after he refused to light a gas drier with a handheld flame, a practice the miner considered
to be unsafe).
242. Hays v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 965 F.2d 1081, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(ruling in favor of an employee who routinely was required to risk his life and limb by greasing machinery while it was in operation, even after he addressed his safety concerns to management).
243. See supra Table 5.A.
244. See supra Table 5.A.
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postemployment benefit law, act as safety nets for safety-conscious workers.245 But these laws were not specifically designed for safety or work refusal
situations; they serve as gap fillers when other safety laws fail employees by
penalizing them for refusing unusually hazardous assignments.246
Courts have adopted the public policy tort (often called wrongful discharge or unjust dismissal) to temper the harsh consequences of employmentat-will.247 Discharged employees benefitted from appellate rulings after they
were fired for refusing to work in a war-torn region,248 seeking a smoke-free
environment,249 requesting a transfer after an employer installed a machine
with live radioactive cobalt,250 refusing to work near cyanide with an open
surgical wound,251 and declining to work on Saturday and Sunday—due to
angina stemming from heart surgery—after working thirty-five hours the previous two days and sixty-one hours for the week.252 The public policy tort
also benefitted a ship captain who was to set sail with his crew twice in a short
time with a barge load of a toxic chemical but refused to leave port due to two
separate hurricane advisories for his routes in the Gulf of Mexico.253
Unemployment insurance claimants won appellate rulings because they

245. See supra Tables 5.A, 5.B.
246. See supra Tables 5.A, 5.B.
247. Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 379 (Wash. 1996) (en banc) (discussing how
courts have adopted an exception to the common law rule that at-will employees could be fired for
any reason: “employees may not be discharged for reasons that contravene public policy”).
248. Parsons v. United Tech. Corp., Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 700 A.2d 655, 658 (Conn. 1997) (ruling
in favor of an employee who was fired immediately after he informed his employer he would not travel
to Bahrain because of concerns for his health, safety, and welfare, supported by a State Department
travel advisory).
249. Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 161 (Ct. App. 1982) (ruling in favor of an employee
who was terminated for his “attempt to obtain a reasonably smoke-free environment”).
250. Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372 (Ill. 1985).
251. W. States Minerals Corp. v. Jones Corp., No. 19697, 1991 Nev. LEXIS 17, at *34 (Nev. Mar.
7, 1991), aff’d sub nom. D’Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206 (Nev. 1991) (“[I]t is violative of public
policy for an employer to dismiss an employee for refusing to work under conditions dangerous to the
employee.”).
252. Wilcox v. Niagara of Wis. Paper Corp., 965 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1992).
253. Borden v. Amoco Coastwise Trading Co., 985 F. Supp. 692, 698 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (“The Court
today recognizes a strong public policy in protecting the safety of not only seamen, but the public as
well, and . . . [t]hese considerations, coupled with the public policy implications surrounding [46
U.S.C.] § 10908, are sufficient to [overcome] the at-will presumption. Thus, the public policy exception is clearly applicable in this case.”).
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had legal justifications to quit jobs that presented some degree of peril.254
These outcomes overcame legal barriers for claimants who quit work.255
These unemployment claims are generally denied because the law requires
evidence that the employer caused the employment relationship to end.256
Even when work conditions create some degree of pressure to consider quitting, unemployment claims are sometimes denied.257 However, when employees in this study were terminated in response to avoiding a threat to their
safety, their claims were ruled to be compensable.258
Moore v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board259 illustrates this
framework. 260 A union electrician was referred to a job at a nuclear power
plant but refused the assignment due to safety concerns.261 Based on news
reports and coworker accounts, he was made aware of alleged safety violations relating to radiation exposure.262 He asked his supervisor for the precise
location of his assigned job and told his supervisor he feared working near

254. See supra notes 248–52 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 248–52 and accompanying text.
256. Jones v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 657 N.E.2d 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“The Act is intended to
benefit only those persons who become unemployed through no fault of their own . . . . [Thus,] ‘an
individual shall be ineligible for benefits because he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employing unit.’”).
257. See, e.g., Davis v. Lab. & Indus. Rels. Comm’n, 554 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(concluding that “pressure of the circumstances” in a quit case could be found as a discharge for purposes of unemployment compensation, though, in this case, a nurse who stopped working forty days
before giving birth and remained out of work for an additional month before applying for unemployment benefits had not been discharged); cf. Burke v. Bd. of Rev., 477 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. Ct. App.
1985) (stating that “‘good cause’ for voluntarily leaving one’s employment results from circumstances
which produce pressure to terminate employment that is both real and substantial and which would
compel a reasonable person under the circumstances to act in the same manner”).
258. See supra Section III.B (noting a misconduct standard in unemployment compensation laws
does not apply when a claimant refuses to perform a job assignment because he or she believes in good
faith that performing the assignment would jeopardize his or her health); McLean v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev., 383 A.2d 533, 535 (Pa. 1978); Ferguson v. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 247 N.W.2d
895, 897 (Minn. 1976); Kuhn v. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 357 A.2d 534, 535 (Pa. 1976); Webster v. Potlatch
Forests, Inc., 187 P.2d 527, 528 (Idaho 1947); Smallwood v. Fla. Dep’t of Com., 350 So. 2d 121, 121
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); see also City of Dallas v. Tex. Emp. Comm’n, 626 S.W.2d 549, 551 (Tex.
App. 1981).
259. Moore v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 215 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320 (Ct. App. 1985).
260. See id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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“red waste.”263 When he was terminated for refusing work,264 he replied:
“Well, I want to make something very clear here. I’m not refusing to do the
work. I can’t go in the radioactive waste area because I’m afraid of the radiation.”265 After this electrician filed for unemployment, a court ruled that he
presented evidence of a “reasonable, good-faith and honest apprehension of
harm to [his] health and safety within the San Onofre work environment, setting forth a condition of employment falling within the ambit of good
cause.”266
V. CONCLUSIONS
Work refusal safety laws serve employees poorly.267 That is the primary
import of my empirical study.268 Certainly, these laws achieve policy objectives when there is a good match between an industry-specific law and a physical hazard that a court or agency can readily comprehend—a falling roof in a
mine,269 molten lead that splashes into a workspace,270 an underwater leak
from an oil rig.271 But even my data sources demonstrate structural problems
with our work safety laws.272 The Bureau of Labor Statistics data collection
for occupational fatalities counts physical events, such as crashes, collisions,
shootings, fires, falls, electrical shocks, contact with objects, and the like.273
At the end of this lengthy survey with many dozens of physical causes, there
are two entries for “overexertion and bodily reaction”—and the data reporting

263. Id.
264. Id. at 318.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 244.
267. See supra Section III.B (reporting data findings in Table 5); see also supra Part IV (interpreting
Table 5.A findings that work refusal safety laws are limited for employees).
268. See supra Part IV (highlighting the difficulty employees have when asserting work refusal
claims).
269. See Gilbert v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 866 F.2d 1433 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
270. Marshall v. N.L. Indus., 618 F.2d 1220, 1222 (7th Cir. 1980).
271. See Miss. Emp. Sec. Comm’n v. Phillips, 562 So. 2d 115, 117 (Miss. 1990).
272. See supra Part IV.
273. See Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI): Definitions, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfdef.htm (Dec. 17, 2020).
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indicates very few occurrences.274
As my research shows, conflating overexertion and a bodily reaction to a
disease obfuscates two entirely different physiological responses to workplace
exposure to potentially lethal conditions.275 It is not even clear that BLS will
be able to capture the work exposures to COVID-19 that are highlighted in
this Article—specifically, the cases reported by front-line workers in
healthcare276 and workers in meatpacking plants.277 In sum, the federal government’s probable undercounting of fatal bodily reactions to exposure events
such as disease, radiation, and chemicals correlates to safety laws that are
stuck in outdated notions of job hazards.278
My study also shows that COVID-19 has shifted work refusal from bluecollar jobs to white-collar and service-sector jobs.279 At some point, however,
the pandemic will recede, and the pattern of work refusal may revert to trends
from 1944 to 2020.280 My study reveals the pronounced use of work refusal
laws in construction and extraction, production, and transportation.281 As the
COVID-19 cases show, however, a virus can present risks that the traditional
occupational fatality survey will likely miss.282
Workplace sexual assaults283 are a case in point. My extensive research
274. See Table A-9. Fatal Occupational Injuries by Event or Exposure for All Fatal Injuries and
Major Private Industry Sector, All United States, 2019, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.: INJURIES,
ILLNESSES & FATALITIES, https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftb0334.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2021)
(reporting eight fatalities in 2019 due to overexertion).
275. See supra Part III (noting the different types of risk—Finding 3.A identifies overexertion in
cases involving risks such as slips and falls, whereas Finding 3.B identifies bodily reaction to chemicals).
276. See Colombe v. SGN, Inc., No. 20-CV-374, 2021 WL 1198304 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 29, 2021).
277. Rural Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 459 F. Supp.3d 1228 (W.D. Mo. 2020)
(seeking injunctive relief for a meatpacking plant that became a major COVID-19 hot spot due to
failure to maintain safe practices such as social distancing, handwashing, masking, and use of sickleave policy).
278. See Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI): Definitions, supra note 273.
279. See supra Finding 1.B.
280. See supra notes 147–48.
281. See supra Section III.B.4 (charting results of cases pre-COVID-19 in Table 4.A—where risk
was prevalent in construction and extraction, production, and transportation).
282. See Brooks v. Corecivic of Tenn. LLC, No. 20cv0994 DMS, 2020 WL 5294614, at *5 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 4, 2020).
283. Extreme forms of sexual harassment appear to present women with scenarios that are analogous to the DOL rule that requires apprehension of injury; however, my research found no evidence
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failed to uncover a single case where an employee refused to return to work,
or quit, because she experienced or feared sexual assault on the job. This
cannot reflect the reality of today’s workplace for some women.284 The juxtaposition of work refusal cases in mining,285 factory,286 and truck driving287
cases—male-dominated jobs that present obvious physical hazards288—with
the total absence of work refusal cases involving sexual assaults demonstrates
how laws and surveys miss some types of work refusal.289
These holes in collecting data on workplace injuries are compounded by
that the rule has been invoked in these situations. See EEOC Sues Virginia IHOP Owner for Sexual
Harassment and Constructive Discharge, EEOC (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-sues-virginia-ihop-owner-sexual-harassment-and-constructive-discharge (settling a lawsuit after a restaurant manager was accused of subjecting female employees to unwanted advances and
touching, “including asking teen workers to show their breasts to him and exposing himself to a teen
worker”); see also Small v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 12-CV-1236, 2019
WL 1593923, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2019) (involving a male corrections officer who relentlessly
pursued female corrections teacher by preying on her religious beliefs); Tri-County Youth Programs,
Inc. v. Acting Deputy Dir. of the Div. of Emp. & Training, 765 N.E.2d 810, 813 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002)
(pertaining to female manager’s denied request for transfer after a youth offender in a detention center
sexually assaulted her); In re Question Submitted by the U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Tenth Cir., 759
P.2d 17 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (concerning a janitor who raped an employee as she was walking to
company cafeteria); Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill. 1997) (involving a restaurant
owner who threatened a waitress, stating that he would “‘give her a stiff one up the a[**],’ ordered her
to perform oral sex on him[,] . . . placed his hand under her skirt and grabbed her leg, grabbed her
buttocks and touched her while attempting to kiss her”); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 582 (Ariz.
1987) (regarding a male supervisor, who, after telling a female employee, “I am going to f[***] you
if it takes me ten years,” grabbed her in a chokehold while running his open hand over her breasts,
stomach, and between her legs).
284. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., Maggard v. Chaney Creek Coal Corp., No. KENT 86-51-D, 1986 WL 221513, at *3
(Ky. May 8, 1986); Bjes v. Consolidated Coal Co., No. PENN 82-26-D, 1982 WL 176180, at *1 (Pa.
Nov. 23, 1982); Sec. of Lab. ex rel. Bryant v. Clinchfield Coal Co., No. VA 80-162-D, 1982 WL
176103, at *4 (Va. July 29, 1982); and Sec’y of Lab., MSHA ex rel. Robinette v. United Castle Coal
Co., No. VA 79-141-D, 1981 WL 141638, at *4, *5 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 1981).
286. See, e.g., Comm’r of Lab. v. Talbert Mfg. Co., 593 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. 1992); Perez v. E. Awning Sys., Inc., No. 15-cv-01692, 2018 WL 4926447 (D. Conn. filed Oct. 10, 2018); Lee v. Ardagh
Glass, Inc., No. 14-cv-0759, 2015 WL 251858 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2015).
287. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Fla. Dep’t of Com., 350 So.2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); McLean
v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 383 A.2d 533 (Pa. 1978); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Reich,
27 F.3d 1133 (6th Cir. 1994).
288. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18b.htm (Jan. 22, 2021) (showing that the percentages of women in
mining [10.1%], manufacturing [29.5%], and truck transportation [12.4%] were low).
289. See supra Part III.
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the outmoded way that the Bureau of Labor Statistics defines a job.290 BLS
has a classification for passenger vehicle drivers that includes taxi drivers and
chauffeurs, as it collects hourly wage information for them.291 Rideshare drivers do not make an hourly wage, however.292 This signifies that the agency
only collects data for passenger vehicle drivers who are in a formal employment relationship, not gig drivers for Uber, Lyft, and other ridesharing platforms.293 To the extent that federal labor statistics are premised on a formal
employment relationship, they omit the growing class of workers who are paid
piece-rates.294 To put this problem more concretely, the 2021 BLS occupational fatality report might fail to include the Instacart shopper who was shot
and killed at a Boulder, Colorado, grocery store but count the King Soopers
employees who lost their lives.295
Several policy suggestions emerge from this research.296 A seemingly
minor idea, perhaps fraught with political controversy, is to amend the Americans with Disabilities Act297 to enact a right of employees to wear a mask at
work, unless an employer can prove that it is an undue hardship.298 This would
appear to address employee concerns about poor employer mitigation for
COVID-19 but would also have a longer impact for workers who are exposed
to second-hand smoke, the flu, and other aerosol hazards.299 As such, this law
290. See Scope of the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI), U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/iif/cfoiscope.htm# (Oct. 8, 2020) (limiting the CFOI to injuries either on the employer’s premises or when related to status as an employee).
291. See Table A-9. Fatal Occupational Injuries by Event or Exposure for All Fatal Injuries and
Major Private Industry Sector, All United States, 2019, supra note 274.
292. See,
e.g.,
How
Your
Pay
Is
Calculated,
LYFT (July
29,
2019),
https://www.lyft.com/hub/posts/pay-breakdown (detailing the method of paying Lyft drivers).
293. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7451 (West 2020) (stating that in California, ride-share
participants are not formal employees of companies, but independent contractors).
294. Id.
295. See also Patrick McGeehan, They Risked Their Lives During Covid. They Still Don’t Earn
Minimum Wage, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/15/nyregion/nycgig-workers-pay.html (reporting that gig workers were more likely than regular employees to suffer
health problems during the COVID-19 pandemic).
296. See supra Part I.
297. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.
298. Id. at § 12111(10)(a)–(b).
299. See Rami Sommerstein et al., Risk of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission by Aerosols, the Rational Use
of Masks, and Protection of Healthcare Workers from COVID-19, 9 ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE &
INFECTION CONTROL 1 (2020).
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would function as a proxy for work refusal safety laws.300 It would also address the increasing trend of work refusal cases in white-collar and servicesector jobs.301
My research also underscores the possible utility of a federal paid sick
leave law, perhaps patterned after California’s law.302 If COVID-19 mutations
persist and evade vaccines, Congress might consider reviving the Emergency
Paid Sick Leave Pay Act.303 Given the large number of immunocompromised
individuals,304 a paid sick leave law would obviate some of the need for these
vulnerable people to refuse work in order to avoid consequential exposures to
seasonal flu, measles, and other upsurges in infectious diseases.305
A third suggestion is to amend the OSH Act work refusal rule to address
some of the occupational disease exposures that this study reports.306 The
current rule protected the two employees in Whirlpool who refused to work
on a suspended screen because an employee had fallen through the screen and
died a short time before.307 But the rule in its present form would not appear
to address the concern of the electrician in the nuclear power plant who refused to work near “red waste,”308 nor the x-ray technician who worked near
live cobalt,309 nor the sawmill employee who refused to work in red cedar
dust,310 nor a worker who had an open wound exposed to cyanide.311 The
300. Id.
301. See supra Finding 1.B.
302. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 245–249 (West 2020). The law provides that an “employee has no less
than 24 hours of accrued sick leave or paid time off by the 120th calendar day of employment or each
calendar year, or in each 12-month period.” Id. at § 246(3). The law also requires supplemental paid
sick leave for COVID-19 related matters. Id. at § 248.1(B)(4)(b).
303. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
304. See Rafael Harpaz, Rebecca M. Dahl & Kathleen L. Dooling, The Prevalence of Immunocompromised Adults: United States, 2013, 3 OPEN FORUM INFECTIOUS DISEASES S1 (2016) (finding 2.8%
of respondents in a large national survey answered that they were informed by a medical professional
that they were immunocompromised).
305. See McGeehan, supra note 295 (describing the how gig workers were classified as essential
workers, therefore increasing exposure to COVID-19 with low levels of compensation); see also supra
Chart A (highlighting the protections offered under federal and state laws).
306. See supra Part V.
307. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 22 (1980).
308. Moore v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 215 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320 (Ct. App. 1985).
309. Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372 (Ill. 1985).
310. Perez v. Clearwater Paper Corp., 184 F. Supp. 3d 831, 835, 840 (D. Idaho 2016).
311. D’Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 207–09 (Nev. 1991).
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contours of an amended law cannot be discerned casually.312 However, the
Department of Labor (DOL) rule’s requirement that an employee can refuse
work only when “there is a real danger of death or serious injury and . . .
insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situation,” to avoid harm could be
modified to redefine the time element.313 This could be broadened to include
exposures like those in the foregoing examples.314 Waiting for a cancer diagnosis to begin the legally sanctioned process of refusing dangerous work is
pointless.315
In addition, a work refusal rule could be fashioned to address sexual316
and racial317 harassment in the workplace that presents a risk of serious injury.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964318 could be modified to broaden discrimination to include work refusal in these cases. This revision would seem
to address situations where employees are constructively discharged in the
course of facing intolerable conditions of harassment that have objective conditions of risk to personal safety.319
Finally, the DOL work refusal rule could be broadened to expand the
OSH Act’s conventional definition of an employee.320 In the paragraph that
regulates work refusal, the rule refers to “employee” five times.321 To cover
gig workers, the rule could be expanded to include the proposed definition of
an employee in the Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2021, a union

312. See supra Part I.
313. See supra Part V.
314. See supra Part V.
315. See Michael H. LeRoy, From Docks to Doctor Offices After 9/11: Refusing to Work Under
“Abnormally Dangerous Conditions,” 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 585, 612 (2004) (stating the purpose of
work refusal laws is to prevent injuries before they occur).
316. See supra notes 283–89 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 2014) (concerning a
Black employee who “endured an extraordinary and steadily intensifying drumbeat of racial insults,
intimidation, and degradation” for more than three years, including “insults, slurs, evocations of the
Ku Klux Klan, statements comparing [B]lack men to apes, death threats, and the placement of a noose
dangling from the plaintiff’s automobile”).
318. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e.
319. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 652(3) (“The term ‘employee’ means
an employee of an employer who is employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce.”).
320. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
321. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (2020).
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election bill before the 117th Congress.322
For now, the state of work refusal safety laws was summed up by a
twenty-year-old grocery clerk at Kroger during the COVID-19 pandemic.323
In response to customers who refused to comply with the store’s masking policy, he stated, “They never listen.”324 His exasperation also applies to lawmakers, labor data collection agencies, and judges who miss the many warning signals in work refusal cases that America’s workplaces are so dangerous
at times that workers are pushed to the brink of resisting work directives.325
VI. APPENDIX: ROSTER OF CASES
Federal Court
Supreme Court
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980)
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974)

322. Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2021, H.R. 842, 117th Cong. (1st Sess. 2021) (“This
bill expands various labor protections related to employees’ rights, [it] (1) revises the definitions of
employee, supervisor, and employer to broaden the scope of individuals covered by the fair labor
standards . . . .”). Specifically, the bill would amend the definition of the NLRA’s Section 2(3) of an
employee such that:
An individual performing any service shall be considered an employee (except
as provided in the previous sentence) and not an independent contractor, unless—
(A) the individual is free from control and direction in connection with the performance of the service, both under the contract for the performance of service
and in fact;
(B) the service is performed outside the usual course of the business of the employer; and
(C) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as that involved in the
service performed.
Id. at § 101.
323. See supra Part I.
324. Lam, supra note 3.
325. See supra Part IV.
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